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This  paper  explores  the  relationship  between  health  care  expenditures of 
spouses. If  expenditures are due largely to random  shocks, the household's 
medical expenditures are smoothed when two or more family members each 
draw from the distribution. On the other hand, if  shocks are positively corre- 
lated, the potential exists for negative wealth shocks that are greater than those 
that would be predicted based on studies of the persistence of individual medi- 
cal expenditures over time. Under traditional systems of insurance, with rela- 
tively low coinsurance levels, the consequences of any putative positive corre- 
lation across family members in expenditures are relatively mild. But under 
the sort of high-deductible insurance that is currently attracting interest from 
the policy community, wealth and utility effects may be appreciable. And under 
systems that include both high-deductible insurance and medical savings ac- 
counts, intrafamily correlations might dramatically change the accumulation 
of wealth in such accounts over a working lifetime. 
Intrafamily correlations might exist for medical, economic, or behavioral 
reasons. Certain conditions,  such as those related to contagious diseases or 
automobile accidents, might affect multiple members of a family. In addition, 
and as described in Eichner (1997), spending by  one family member under 
most traditional employer-provided insurance plans lowers the price of  care 
faced by  other family members and may thereby induce additional expendi- 
ture. Finally, there may be fundamental differences in behaviors across fami- 
lies. Some individuals may make choices about their lives that lead, in the short 
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run or the long run, to lower health care expenditures. And such individuals 
may seek out, as partners,  individuals with similar values. In extreme cases, 
behaviors exhibited by one family member may directly affect expenditures by 
a spouse. The recently documented consequences of secondhand smoke pro- 
vide such an example. Equally  important, individuals may display different 
levels of inclination to initiate contact with the health care system. And again, 
there is every reason to suppose that individuals with particular levels of “taste 
for medical care” will choose similar individuals as partners. 
The empirical strategy used in this paper will seek to differentiate between 
these various explanations for intrafamily correlations. To do this, I will look 
at individuals covered under different sorts of insurance plans and their expen- 
ditures for different sorts of care. By comparing the correlation between spou- 
sal expenditures in plans with coinsurance to the correlation between spousal 
expenditures in plans without  coinsurance,  I can measure  the extent of  the 
price effect. And by comparing the correlation between spouses for different 
sorts of expenditures, I can at least begin to sort out how much of the observed 
correlation in expenditures is due to factors other than taste. For example, the 
correlation in total medical expenditures between spouses may well be driven 
by correlation  in expenditures for routine care. But if  I  restrict attention to 
expenditures related to surgical interventions, the effects of contagious disease 
and certain taste parameters are likely eliminated. 
I also seek to determine where in the distribution of expenditures the corre- 
lations appear to be strongest. For example, there may be large correlations at 
lower expenditure levels produced by taste parameters, price effects, or conta- 
gious diseases. But the correlation could diminish higher in the distribution. In 
other words, there may be a great deal of information about whether a husband 
spends nothing or $300 on medical care in whether his wife spends nothing or 
$300. But there is likely less information concerning the husband’s spending 
patterns in whether the wife spends $300 or $30,000. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections. Section 6.1 uses a 
simple framework to demonstrate the effect of intrafamily correlations on the 
standard microeconomic  insurance problem. The analysis suggests that sub- 
stantial intrafamily correlations can dramatically alter the value to individuals 
of insurance against the risk of medical expenditures.  Section 6.2 introduces 
the data consisting of claims records of employees of two Fortune 500 firms 
and their spouses. The critical distinction between these two firms is that the 
first  provides  medical  coverage  with  standard coinsurance provisions  con- 
sisting of  copayments  and deductibles,  while  the other provides  first-dollar 
coverage of  almost all expenditures. In order to measure correlations for spe- 
cific sorts of expenditures, it is necessary to adopt a strategy for aggregating 
claims that are likely due to the same medical condition. Section 6.3 describes 
the strategy I adopt in this paper and provides some descriptive evidence that 
it accomplishes the stated goal. Section 6.4 introduces the basic econometric 
framework utilized  in this work. Rather than trying to faithfully capture the 277  The Impact of  Intrafarnily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
extremely long right tail of the expenditure distribution, I seek to estimate the 
probability that an individual’s expenditure falls above a particular threshold. 
And most important, I will explore whether the fact that an individual’s expen- 
ditures exceed a threshold provides information about the spending of his or 
her  partner.  In  section  6.5, I consider  the  possibility  that  correlations  may 
change over a working lifetime  as a function  of the  aging process.  Finally, 
section 6.6 presents some illustrative utility calculations and discusses the im- 
plication of the estimation results for systems of medical savings accounts and 
catastrophic insurance. 
6.1  Risk, Insurance, and Intrafamily Correlation 
This section presents the traditional microeconomic insurance problem, but 
modified to allow for the possibility of losses that are correlated among family 
members  covered  under  a single insurance  policy. I will  show that positive 
correlation in losses within families unambiguously increases the value to fam- 
ilies of purchasing insurance. This is reflected in their willingness to pay larger 
spread, or risk premium, over the expected loss. 
Consider first a single risk-averse individual with a concave utility function 
U(*)  such that U’(.) > 0 and U’’(.)  < 0. The standard insurance problem con- 
siders the expected utility of this individual integrated over all possible losses, 
which are assumed to follow some densityf,(i): 
E  U(M - L) = I,  U(M - 1)f,(l)  dl, 
where M  is income. Willingness to pay for insurance coverage is usually ex- 
pressed in terms of a certainty equivalent, the amount an individual would pay 
with probability one to avoid drawing some realization 1 from the densityf,(l). 
This certainty equivalent c is found by solving 
U(M - c) =  5,  U(M - l)f,(l)  dl. 
If  the certainty equivalent c equals the expected value of  the loss, then the 
individual is unwilling to pay for insurance. But if U(.)  is concave as assumed 
above, c will always exceed the expected loss. As developed in Arrow (197  I), 
the individual is then willing to pay a risk premium to avoid the uncertainty in 
drawing from the densityf,(l). 
Now I consider the same problem, but modified to consider, not an individ- 
ual facing a loss  with density  functionf,(l),  but  a married  couple facing a 
realization of two losses 1, and 1,  with the joint density functionf,,.,,(l,,  1,). The 
critical issue, of course, is how the joint density function affects the certainty 
equivalent and hence the risk premium that the family is willing to pay to avoid 
the uncertainty of drawing I, and 1,  fromfLl,L2(11,  1,).  In particular, the issue will 
be the correlation  coefficient between  1, and 1,  implied by the joint density 
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Suppose a  second joint  density gLI,L2(11,  1,)  differs  from f,,,,z(ll,  1,)  only 
in that the correlation between 1, and 1,  is higher, so pg > pr  The expected loss 
L is the same under either of the functions, since E(L) = E(1,) + E(1J does not 
depend on the correlation between the two individual losses. But the variance 
of the family loss L, V(L)  = V(1,)  + V(1,) + 2pu,,u,*,  is an increasing function 
of the intrafamily correlation p. 
If both density functions g,,,,,(l,,  12) andf,l,,z(Z,, 1J  yield the same expected 
loss but  the loss under gLl,L2(11,  Z2)  has higher variance than the loss under 
fL,,,z(l,,  1J,  a risk-averse family will  always prefer  to face density  function 
f,,,,  (l,,  12) rather than gL,,%(l1,  1,).  Both imply the same expected loss, but the 
variance under gLI,,Z(lI,  1,)  is greater. This intuitive idea can be formalized using 
the idea of second-order stochastic dominance. The density fLIJl,,  1,)  is said 
to second-order stochastically dominate gLI,Lz(ll,  12) if both have the same ex- 
pected value and 
6’ j:  GLI.,(4,  1,)  dl2 dl,  2 6’ j:  q,[<  (119  12) dl, dl, 
for any  1, and I,,  where G and F are the distribution functions corresponding 
to density functions g andf, respectively. This condition will always be satisfied 
if the variance of  the total loss, the sum of 1, and I,,  described by the density 
gLI,L2(11,  12) exceeds the variance of the total loss described byf,l,,2(1,,  1J.  As 
shown in Rothschild  and Stiglitz (1970), second-order stochastic dominance 
is sufficient to establish 
I,,,,,  fl,L2(4~  W(Y  - 1, - 4)  dl, dl2 
>  I,,,,  gL,,(l,,  1,)u(Y - 1, -  12) dl, dl, 
or, equivalently, that the expected utility is higher if the loss followsf,l,,,(ll,  12) 
rather than g,,~,,(1,,  I,). 
This result suggests that the utility consequences of insurance schemes, and 
particularly those that involve relatively high potential out-of-pocket payments, 
may look quite different when evaluated on a family rather than on an individ- 
ual basis. In particular, schemes that may have acceptable consequences for the 
utility of a single individual under all states of nature might have the potential 
to impose ruinous losses on families if substantial intrafamily correlations in 
medical expenditures exist. The empirical analysis described in this paper is 
an effort to measure the extent of these potentially important intrafamily (and 
particularly spousal) correlations in medical expenditures. 
6.2  Firm Claims Data 
The empirical  analysis described  in this paper uses claims data from two 
Fortune 500 firms. The firms differ along several dimensions. Most important 
for this analysis, firm  1 offers its employees a plan that requires them to bear 
none  of  the cost of  their medical  care, while  firm 2 offers  its employees a 279  The Impact of  Intrafamily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
Table 6.1  Summary Data Description 
Firm 1  Firm 2 
Mean employee spending in  1992 ($) 
Standard deviation of employee spending in  1992 ($) 
Mean spousal spending in 1992 ($) 
Standard deviation of spousal spending in  1992 ($) 
Mean employee age 
Mean spouse age 
Mean difference in ages (employee age minus spouse age) 
Percentage of male employees 



















choice of plans all of  which incorporate more traditional  coinsurance provi- 
sions. In addition, firm 1 employees are located at a single site, while firm 2 
employees are spread over six locations. All of the insurance plans at both firms 
incorporate limited case management for certain high-cost medical conditions 
and concurrent reviews of hospital stays. None cover pharmacy charges, men- 
tal health treatment, substance abuse treatment, or dental care, which are all 
covered separately under “carve-out’’ arrangements. 
Married couples  were  formed from all individuals filing claims between 
1990 and 1993  who could be unambiguously matched with a spouse. The anal- 
ysis was then restricted to those married couples formed by employees between 
ages 25 and 55 whose spouses were aged 20 to 60. In firm  1, 13,273 such 
couples were  identified,  while  the  corresponding  number  from firm 2 was 
6,313. Table 6.1 shows  some basic  descriptive information  about the  data. 
Thus, on average, the employee at firm 2 is younger, is more likely to be fe- 
male, and spends more in 1992. 
Claims data provide excellent information on the timing and nature of con- 
tacts with the health care system, as well as who in the family received treat- 
ment. Claims data are less useful in determining who was covered by the insur- 
ance plan during a particular period. Only by observing an individual filing a 
claim do I know that an individual is present. And when an individual does not 
file a claim during a particular period, it is presently  impossible to discern 
whether  the individual has received  no treatment or has  separated from the 
firm. I hope that the impact of this issue is minimized by studying firms that 
have stable workforces and individuals who have not yet reached ages at which 
retirement is likely. To address this issue more directly, additional enrollment 
data is required that will become available in the near future. 
6.3  Classification of Claims 
Most contacts with the health care system generate multiple claims. For ex- 
ample, the  individual who  visits the  doctor  complaining  of  stomach pains 
might receive an examination, blood tests, and an X-ray. Each of these may 280  Matthew J. Eichner 
generate separate and, in some cases, multiple claims. Each claim may carry a 
diagnosis code, a procedure code, both, or neither, Continuing with the above 
example, the examination may be coded for a digestive disorder (diagnosis) 
and a medical procedure (examination), while the blood test may be coded as 
a laboratory procedure without a diagnosis. The empirical work described in 
this paper seeks to demonstrate that, for certain types of  care, intrafamily cor- 
relations are greater than for other types of care. To do this requires grouping 
claims together by procedure and diagnosis in a sensible way, so that all claims 
stemming from the stomach pain scenario sketched above can be classified as 
a single treatment episode. 
The idea of grouping claims to form treatment episodes dates to the RAND 
experiment in the 1970s. As described in Newhouse (1993), clinicians partici- 
pating  in  the study made notes  that explicitly  indicated which claims were 
related. This information, along with the chronological spacing of treatments, 
allowed all charges to be grouped that “reflect[ed] decisions about the same 
medical problem.” These episodes were then assigned to one of  four catego- 
ries: hospital, physician and supplies, dental, and pharmacy. 
Because claims data lack the explicit links relied upon by the RAND investi- 
gators, I have taken a different approach. Furthermore, since the claims data 
explicitly exclude pharmacy and dental charges, their classification of episodes 
into one of four categories does not lend itself to my purpose. Instead, I have 
adopted  an algorithm using exclusively  chronological criteria to group epi- 
sodes. The algorithm is fairly simple, yet as I will argue, it produces episodes 
that are internally consistent, as well as consistent with reasonable priors about 
health care delivery. 
Under this typology, an outpatient episode begins on the date an outpatient 
treatment is received, and a window of  14 days is opened. Any further claims 
during that period are grouped with the initial treatment. When each additional 
treatment is received, the window is extended for an additional two weeks from 
the date of service. When two weeks pass during which no additional claims 
are filed, the outpatient episode is deemed complete. The procedure with re- 
spect to inpatient episodes is similar, although the window is 28 rather than 14 
days in length. If  an episode begins with an outpatient claim, a subsequent 
inpatient claim for treatment lengthens the window measured from all further 
claims in the episode from 14 to 28 days. 
Once episodes are defined, I then group them using a hierarchy of the ICD- 
9 and CPT codings, which designate particular diagnoses and procedures, re- 
spectively. At the top of the hierarchy are episodes related to injuries and poi- 
sonings, as reflected by the presence in the grouping of at least one claim with 
an ICD-9 code corresponding to such a diagnosis. The next level consists of 
those episodes containing at least one claim referencing an inpatient or outpa- 
tient surgical procedure. Lower still are episodes with an inpatient or outpatient 
medical  procedure,  again  as indicated  by  the presence  of  an  appropriately 
coded claim. Another level consists of  episodes that consist of at least one 
claim indicative of a diagnostic test. And, finally, there is the residual. 281  The Impact of Intrafamily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
Table 6.2  Treatment Episodes by Type 
Firm 1  Firm 2 
Percentage  Percentage  Mean  Percentage  Percentage  Mean 
Episode Type  of Episodes  of  Cost  Cost ($)  of Episodes  of Cost  Cost ($) 
Injury/poisoning  12.47  21.46  1,526  10.93  24.81  1,863 
Surgical  18.78  43.40  2,068  18.15  48.46  2,191 
Medical  35.41  26.46  669  49.35  19.56  325 
Diagnostic  18.62  4.54  218  8.80  2.95  276 
Residual  14.71  4.34  264  12.77  4.22  27 1 
Table 6.3  Treatment Episodes by Length 





Percentage  Mean 
of cost  cost ($) 
Percentage 
of  Episodes 
1 Day 
< 1 Week 
< 2 Weeks 
< 3 Weeks 
< 4 Weeks 
< 6 Weeks 
< 8 Weeks 
< 3 Months 










14.20  192 
14.93  1,238 
14.54  1,266 
9.34  1,619 
7.20  2,943 
10.53  3,937 
5.63  4,988 
8.93  7,348 










Percentage  Mean 
of  cost  cost ($) 
11.96  159 
11.21  85 2 
11.23  807 
8.70  1,141 
6.80  1,878 
9.3  I  2,575 
6.24  3,835 
10.67  6,049 
23.89  17,109 
Note that in this typology each level subsumes the levels below. An individ- 
ual receiving only a cardiogram would produce an episode coded as a diagnos- 
tic procedure. If  he or she had a cardiogram and also a medical examination, 
the episode would be categorized as medical. A cardiogram and medical exam- 
ination followed by open heart surgery would be classified as a surgical ep- 
isode. 
Table 6.2  shows the breakdown of episodes constructed from claims filed by 
employees and spouses at the two firms during the  1990-92  period. In both 
firms, injury/poisoning  and surgical episodes account for a disproportionate 
share of expenditures. For example, only 18 percent of the episodes of treat- 
ment for firm 2 employees are classified as surgical, but these account for al- 
most one-half of expenditures. On the other hand, the more numerous medical 
episodes account for less of the total cost. Again referring to firm 2, the 49 
percent of episodes classified as medical account for only 20 percent of expen- 
ditures. In both firms, the importance of  the so-called residual episodes, those 
that cannot be classified elsewhere in the hierarchy, is relatively  small as the 
cost share of these episodes is below 5 percent. 
Table 6.3 describes the treatment episodes, defined using the algorithm and 
classifications outlined above, in terms of their length, that is, the number of 282  Matthew J. Eichner 
days from the treatment that initiates the episode to the final treatment included 
in the grouping. The distribution of episode lengths is quite similar across the 
two firms. And, as in table 6.2,  the category that contains most of  the episodes 
accounts for a relatively small percentage of the cost. 
6.4  Estimation of Intrafamily Correlations 
A primary goal of this work is to assess empirically the magnitude of intra- 
family correlations in medical expenditures. In this section, I outline three pos- 
sible approaches to this analysis and describe the bivariate probit model that I 
choose to apply. I then show how the results of the bivariate probit analysis can 
be easily interpreted using the concept of conditional probability. 
One option in measuring the correlation is to estimate a system of two re- 
gressions, one for the employee and one for the spouse, and to allow some 
covariance structure between the equations. This sort of estimation is generally 
referred to as seemingly unrelated least squares (SUR). The problem is funda- 
mentally complicated by the fact that both equations, employee expenditures 
and spousal expenditures, are censored, with a substantial proportion of indi- 
viduals spending nothing. Estimation of an SUR system with censored depen- 
dent variables requires restrictive assumptions concerning the distribution of 
both expenditures and the disturbance terms and would still prove computa- 
tionally intractable because construction of the likelihood function would re- 
quire evaluating “hybrid”  density and distribution functions for the assumed 
bivariate distribution. 
Another  approach estimates  the joint  distribution  function  at  particular 
points. For example, controlling for demographic factors, I might estimate the 
probability  that  the  spouse  spends more than  $1,000 while  the  employee 
spends more than zero. This is done using the bivariate probit specification. 
The assumption of joint normality is relatively harmless since I do not need to 
claim that I accurately capture the shape of the probability mass between any 
two points of  support. The probability  in which I am interested is the only 
parameter of  the relevant Bernoulli distribution.  In other words, I  care only 
about whether expenditures are above or below some threshold. The exact na- 
ture of  the distribution  above and below this threshold is unimportant;  only 
how much of the density is above and below the threshold is critical. 
A third possibility involves a bivariate ordered probit model. Instead of esti- 
mating the joint probability that the spouse’s expenditures exceed some level 
and the employee’s expenditures exceed some level, I would estimate the joint 
probability that the spouse’s expenditures fall in a particular range and that the 
employee’s expenditures fall in a particular range. Here the assumption of joint 
normality  is more restrictive,  since the outcome of  interest  is  not  simply 
whether a realization falls above or below some threshold. 
Another troublesome implication of the bivariate ordered probit is that the 
correlation is constrained to be equal across the entire expenditure distribution. 283  The Impact of Intrafamily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
One might imagine that positive expenditures by  a spouse are correlated with 
positive expenditures by an employee. But it is unlikely  that the correlation 
persists  higher  in the distribution and  that expenditures  above $1,000 by  a 
spouse are as correlated with expenditures above $1,000 by an employee. The 
results are therefore very sensitive to the choice of expenditure ranges. I will 
opt to avoid this issue by using the simple bivariate probit framework to esti- 
mate the probabilities of exceeding certain points in the joint distribution. 
A simple probit model of expenditures is written 
P(Y  >  y)  = P(zP + E  >  o), 
where y is a particular threshold of interest (often zero) and Z is a vector of 
independent variables including a constant. Making the distributional assump- 
tion that E follows a normal distribution, the relation can be rewritten 
P(Y  >  Y)  = @(ZP), 
where @ is the distribution function that gives the probability in the lower tail 
of the normal distribution. 
This framework is easily modified to deal with a system of two equations. 
Suppose 
P(Y  >  y,andY,  >  y2) = P(P,Z, + E,  >  0  and  &Z2 + E?  >  O), 
where the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the equations. The distributional assump- 
tion is then 
and the relevant probability can be written 
where CP, is the distribution function for the bivariate normal distribution writ- 
ten above. 
The parameters  PI,  P2, and  p can be estimated using  standard maximum 
likelihood methods. The exact specifications for firm 1 are 
Z,P,  = a,  + &,Age, + p,,Male,  + P13Age,  *  Male,. 
For firm 2,  five location and two plan indicators are added for each member of 
the couple: 284  Matthew J. Eichner 
Table 6.4  Bivariate Probit Estimates 
Firm  I  Firm 2 
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Nore: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Statistically distinct from zero (p  < 0.05). 
**Statistically distinct from zero (p  < 0.01). 
The aim is to ensure that p, the parameter of interest, does not capture correla- 
tion related to both employee and spouse living in the same location, receiving 
care under the same plan, or being roughly the same age. 
I begin by considering whether the sum of expenditures  for all treatment 
episodes exceeds zero. I then continue by  increasing the threshold from zero 
to $500 and then to $1,000. Results from this estimation are shown in table 6.4. 
The correlations between employees and spouses are large and quite precisely 
measured. In addition, the correlation decreases at higher levels of  expendi- 
ture. For firm  1 couples, the correlation  drops from 0.41 to 0.22 when  the 
threshold is raised from zero to $500. A similar pattern  is evident for firm 2 
couples. This can be explained by the decreasing importance of taste parame- 
ters higher in the distribution. Whether a spouse chooses to visit the doctor 
with a common cold is likely correlated with whether an employee would make 
a similar choice. But whether a spouse would spend larger sums is likely less 285  The Impact of Intrafamily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
a function of the taste parameters that account for at least some of measured 
intrafamily correlations. 
Finally, the estimated correlations for firm  1 are appreciably smaller than 
for firm 2. An obvious explanation for this regularity involves price effects that 
are present in firm 2 but not in firm 1. Recall that firm 2, unlike firm 1, requires 
coinsurance payments for standard medical care. These coinsurance payments 
take the form of a deductible that must be satisfied before insurance payments 
begin as well a copayment that continues from the point at which the deduct- 
ible is met to some stop loss limit. As a result of the deductible and copayment 
requirements, each family faces a nonlinear price schedule for medical care, 
with the price falling once the deductible is satisfied and again once the stop 
loss limit is reached. Since the coinsurance provisions apply to the family as a 
whole, spending by  one spouse can reduce, under plans like those in firm 2, 
the price of care faced by the other spouse. 
Table 6.5 shows the correlation coefficients from additional estimation of 
joint probability distributions. Specifications are similar to those in table 6.4, 
but with additional expenditure thresholds and varying subsets of claims. As 
in table 6.4, the correlations are uniformly higher for couples covered by firm 
2, suggesting the existence of substantial price effects. Furthermore, the corre- 
lations are largest when all episodes are included in the estimation. As episodes 
are restricted to those of the medical type, the correlations fall. Correlations 
between  employee  and  spousal  spending for surgical  episodes, which  are 
closer to the top of the hierarchy introduced in section 6.3, fall further. This 
suggests that moving up the hierarchy reduces the influence of taste parameters 
relative to external factors such as health shocks and provider decisions. Esti- 
mation results related to injury/poisoning episodes are an exception to this pat- 
tern, largely because a substantial fraction of injury/poisonings affect multiple 
family members.' 
Increasing the threshold for each type of  episode decreases the estimated 
correlation. Again, this is related to the relative importance of taste parameters 
as determinants of spending for different levels of expenditure. Both spouses 
may well opt to have the dermatologist remove benign growths within the same 
time frame. Expenditures for surgical removal of malignant tumors are much 
less likely to be correlated. Thus the correlation of 0.1628 for spending on 
surgical episodes above zero falls to essentially zero for spending on surgical 
episodes above $4,000. 
To facilitate interpretation of these estimated correlations, it is useful to ex- 
press them as conditional probabilities. This is done using the basic definition 
of conditional probability: 
1. These results may seem to contradict the arguments presented in Eichner (1997) concerning 
the exogeneity of injuries and poisonings to family members. But those results were predicated 
on excluding all injury and poisoning claims that affected multiple family members. In addition, 
much of the exogenous variation was produced by  injuries and poisonings to children, who are 
not included in the present analysis. Table 6.5  Estimated Correlations 


















































Above zero  0.2515 
(0.0188) 
Above $500  0.2349 
(0.0333) 
Above $1 ,000  0.1974 
(0.0445) 
Above $2,000  0.0992 
(0.0644) 
Above $4,000  0.1085 
(0.0801) 
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0.3995 
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where the subscript e refers to the employee and the subscript s to the spouse. 
The conditional probability is evaluated  for a couple with particular demo- 
graphic characteristics. Here I will consider a 45-year-old male employee mar- 
ried to a woman of the same age. Table 6.6 shows the conditional probabilities 
for different thresholds and subsets of episodes and again makes clear that the 
correlations are strongest in the  lower portions of  the distributions. For ex- 
ample, a spouse with  positive expenditures  increases the probability  of  the 
employee’s incumng positive expenditures by 0.2689. But a spouse with ex- 
penditures exceeding $2,000 only increases the probability of the employee’s 
exceeding that level by 0.06. 
6.5  Age-Dependent Correlations 
In evaluating the effects of  medical savings accounts in combination with 
catastrophic health  insurance, a critical issue involves accumulation  of bal- 
ances in the accounts over a working lifetime. Intrafamily correlations, which 
potentially depend on the age of the couple, could have major effects on accu- 
mulation, particularly  if the correlation increases with age so that the relation 
is strongest during the  years in  which  the  largest medical expenditures  are 
likely to occur. This might occur if  the effect of  certain behavior decisions 
made over a lifetime produce increasingly important health consequences as a 
couple ages. For example, smoking (either first- or secondhand) is surely such 
a behavioral factor, and the deleterious consequences of smoking become man- 
ifest, not when individuals are in their 20s and 30s, but when they have reached 
more advanced stages of life. 
I can easily reparametrize the bivariate probit model to allow for the depen- 
dence of the correlation coefficient on the age of the employee: 
where p(Age) is a simple linear function: 
P(Age)  = Yo  + ?Ayape. 
Estimates of pe,  ps,  and y are obtained as before using maximum likelihood. 
The results of this estimation, presented in table 6.7, show that correlation 
decreases with employee age, although in most cases the coefficient on age is 
not statistically distinct from zero. For example, each additional year is pre- 
dicted to decrease the correlation in the bivariate normal distribution for posi- 
tive expenditures in firm  1 by  -0.0016.  As shown in table 6.8, the implied 
correlations for couples with employees of ages 30, 40, and 50 are 0.4334, 
0.4174, and 0.4014, respectively. Table 6.6  Conditional Probabilities 
Firm I  Firm 2 
All Episodes 
P(u, > 01 Y,  > 0)  0.6768 
P(r, > 0 I Y,  < 0)  0.4079 
P(  u, > 500 I Y\ > 500)  0.3646 
P(  r, > 500 I  Y,  < 500)  0.2380 
P(u, > 1,000 I Y,  > 1,000)  0.2745 
P(r, > 1,000  I  Y,  < 1,000)  0.1699 
P(  r, >  2,000  I  Y,  > 2,000)  0.1761 
P(  u, >  2,000 I Y,  < 2,000)  0.1161 
P  (  u, > 4,000 I  Y,  >  4,000)  0.1193 
P(  r, > 4,000  I  Y,  < 4,000)  0.0765 
P(r,>OIY,>O)  0.4357 
P(u, > 0 I  Y,  < 0)  0.2667 
P  ( r, > 500 I  Ys  > 500)  0.1924 
0.1051 
P(r,> 1,00OIY\> 1,000)  0.1 198 
P(u, > 1,000 I  Y,  < 1,000)  0.0629 
P  (r,  > 2,000  I  Y,  > 2,000)  0.0684 
P  (r,  > 2,000 I Y\ < 2,000)  0.0394 
P(  > 4,000 I  Y,  >  4,000)  0.0610 
P(  Y, > 4,000 I  Y% <  4,000)  0.0269 
P(r, > 0  I  Y,  > 0)  0.2354 
P(r, > 01 Y,  <O)  0.1584 
P( r, > 500 I Y$ > 500)  0.1323 
P(  r, > 500 I Y, < 500)  0.0875 
P(r, > 1.000 I  Y\ > 1,000)  0.0967 
P(r, > 1,000 I Y\ < 1,000)  0.0697 
P( r, > 2,000 I  Y,  > 2,000)  0.0649 
P  (r,  > 2,000 I  Y,  <  2,000)  0.0490 
P(  r, > 4,000 I Y,  > 4,000)  0.0287 
P(  % > 4,000 I  Y> < 4,000)  0.0299 
Injurj/Poisoning  Episodes 
P(r, > 0 I  Y,  > 0)  0.281 1 
P(r, > 01 Y,  <O)  0.1480 
P(r,>5001Y~>500)  0.1226 
P(u,>5001Y,<500)  0.0485 
P( r, > 1,000  I Y,  > 1,000)  0.0806 
P(r, > 1,000  I  Y,  < 1,000)  0.0324 
P( r, > 2,000  I  Y,  > 2,000)  0.0375 
P( u, > 2,000  I  Y,  < 2,000)  0.0216 
P(  r, >  4,000 I  Ys  > 4,000)  0.0304 
P( r, > 4,000 I  Y,  < 4,000)  0.0159 
Medical Episodes 
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Table 6.7  Bivariate Probit Estimates: Correlation Parametrized as a Function 



































































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Statistically distinct from zero (p  < 0.05). 
**Statistically distinct from zero (p  < 0.01). 
Thus correlations appear likely to be lower in the later years of life when 
big expenditures typically occur. Such a pattern is at least partially explained 
by the fact that  when individuals are relatively  young  and healthy the taste 
parameters  that are presumably  at least partially jointly determined between 
partners are relatively  more important than in later life, when health shocks 
and provider decisions play a larger role in determining health outlays. And, 
based on this empirical estimation, the cumulative effect of behavior over the 
life cycle appears to be swamped by the random shocks in the later stages 
of life. 290  Matthew J. Eichner 
Table 6.8  Estimated Correlations Parametrized as a Function of Age: 
All Expenditures 
Above zero  -0.00 16 
(0.001  8) 
Above $500  -0.0050 
(0.0023) 
Above $1,000  -0.0006 
(0.0026) 
Above $2,000  -0.0010 
(0.0032) 
Above $4,000  0.0046 
(0.004  1) 
Firm 1 
0.48 14**  0.4334  0.4174  0.4014 
(0.08 14) 
0.4393**  0.2893  0.2393  0.1893 
(0.10  15) 
0.2308*  0.2128  0.2068  0.2008 
(0.1175) 
0.1896  0.1596  0.1496  0.1396 
(0.1444) 
-0.0798  0.0582  0.1042  0.1502 
(0.1882) 
Firm 2 
Above zero  -0.0007 
(0.00  17) 
Above $500  -0.0037 
(0.0022) 
(0.0025) 
Above $2,000  -0.0078* 
(0.0031) 
Above $4,000  -0.0076 
(0.0042) 
Above $1.000  -  0.0074** 
0.7177**  0.6967  0.6897  0.6827 
(0.0687) 
0.5547**  0.4437  0.4067  0.3697 
(0.0950) 
0.6274**  0.4054  0.3314  0.2574 
(0.1080) 
0.5492**  0.3 142  0.2372  0.1592 
(0.1328) 
0.4665**  0.2385  0.1625  0.0865 
(0.1826) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Statistically distinct from zero (p  <  0.05). 
**Statistically distinct from zero (p  < 0.01). 
6.6  Utility Consequences of Intrafamily Correlation 
In this section, I will provide some illustrative calculations detailing the cost 
of correlation between partners under  a prototypical  catastrophic insurance 
plan. The key provision  of the plan  I consider is a $2,000 annual individual 
deductible so that a married couple can, at most, suffer a $4,000 out-of-pocket 
loss. And once again, I will focus on the case of a 45-year-old male employee 
and his wife of the same age. My empirical approach has thus far abstracted 
from the continuous nature of the expenditure distribution, and I will continue 
to do so in this context by assigning individuals to be either at or below the 
$2,000 individual annual deductible. 
I will first consider the joint distribution defined by the following four proba- 
bilities: P(< 2  $2,000 and  Y, 2  $2,000),  P(x  2  $2,000 and  Y, < $2,000), 
P(x < $2,000 and  Y, < $2,000),  and P(K < $2,000 and Y, 2  $2,000).  This 
distribution is obtained from the previously estimated probit specification. For 
firm 1, this distribution can be written 291  The Impact of Intrafamily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
Y&  < $2,000 
Y, 2 $2,000 
0.7671  0.1008 
(0.0698)  (0.015  1) 
0.1089  0.0233 
(0.0670)  (0.0193) 
The standard errors appearing in parentheses below each estimated probability 
are obtained from the bivariate probit estimation results using the Taylor series 
approximation referred to as the delta method. 
The analogous bivariate distribution for firm 2 is 
I  Y, <  $2.000  Y. 2 $2,000 
Y, < $2,000 
Y, 2  $2,000 
0.6568  0.1191 
(0.0564)  (0.0189) 
0.1660  0.0582 
(0.0527)  (0.0174) 
For each firm, I also construct a second bivariate distribution that has the 
same expected value but correlation equal to zero. This is done by applying a 
basic definition of independence and taking the product of the appropriate mar- 
ginal distributions obtained by  summing over the joint distributions shown 
above. For firm 1, this distribution is 
Ye <  $2,000  Ye 2 $2,000 
Y, < $2,000  0.7602  0.1077 
(0.0712)  (0.0110) i  Y, 2  $2,000  (0.0712)  0.1157  (0.0159)  0.0164 
while for firm 2 the tabular representation is 
I  Ye <  $2,000  Ye 2  $2,000 
Y, <  $2,000 
Y, 2  $2,000 
0.6383  0.1375 
(0.0577)  (0.0148) 
0.1844  0.0397 
(0.0573)  (0.0151) 
For each firm, I also calculate the mean expenditure for the appropriate ages 
and genders conditional on expenditures below $2,000. For firm 1, this condi- 
tional expectation is $340 for the employee and $374 for the spouse. The corre- 
sponding numbers for firm 2 are $234 and $240. I will take these figures to 
represent the loss when expenditures do not exceed $2,000 per person. Using 
these figures, the expected out-of-pocket loss for a firm 1 couple is $926, while 
the figure for firm 2 is $1,375. Note that these expected losses are identical 
under both the actual (p >  0) and constructed (p = 0) distributions. 
My  approach will compare the amount individuals are willing to pay  to 
avoid facing the actual distribution with the amount they will pay to eliminate 
the uncertainty embodied in the constructed distribution. The difference I will 
interpret as some measure in dollars of  the utility cost of  intrafamily corre- 292  Matthew J. Eichner 
Table 6.9  Estimated Cost of Correlations 
Risk  Risk Premium if p  Percentage 
Income  Premium ($)  Equals Zero ($)  Change 
Firm 1 
$30,000  U(M)  = In  M 
U(M)  = M025 
U(M)  = M05 
U(M)  = M075 
$50,000  U(M)  = In M 
U(M)  = 
U(M)  = MOS 
U(M)  = M075 
U(M)  = M025 
U(M)  = MO' 
U(M)  = 






































$30,000  U(M)  = In M 
U(M)  =  A4025 
U(M)  = MUS 
U(M)  = M"7' 
$50,000  U(M)  = In M 
U(M)  = Mo25 
U(M)  = M05 
U(M)  = M0'5 
$70,000  U(M)  = In M 
U(M)  = MoZ5 
U(M)  = MO5 





































lation. The first step is to calculate the certainty equivalent, the amount the 
couple would be willing to pay to avoid facing the distribution. This is done by 
solving for c,  and cc so as to equate utility with and without uncertainty: 
4 
WM - c,)  = c U(M - 1,  -  Qf&,L5(le7  lq, PI, 
U(M - c,)  = c U(M - 1,  - ()f&,Jle9  I,,  0). 
4 
Here M is again income, L, the loss incurred by the employee, L, the loss in- 
curred by  the spouse, fL,.,,(le,  l,,  p) denotes the actual distribution,  and fL,.L, 
(le,  I,,  0) denotes the constructed distribution. Risk premiums can then be calcu- 
lated assumingfLe,L,(le,  l,, p) and  fLe,L,(le,  I,,  0) by subtracting the certainty equiv- 
alent under each distribution from the expected loss. 
Table 6.9 shows these risk premiums for a variety of income levels under 293  The Impact of Intrafamily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
several different utility functions. These are surprisingly small. Under log util- 
ity and income of  $30,000, for example, the risk premium for the actual firm 
1 distribution is $13.12 while the risk premium for the constructed distribution 
is $12.32. The difference of $0.80 represents the cost of correlation under this 
set of assumptions. In this case, the cost of correlation represents 6.1 percent of 
the risk premium under the actual (p >  0) distribution. While the risk premium 
decreases with increasing income as expected, the fraction related to intrafam- 
ily correlation remains steady at about 6 percent for firm 1. A similar pattern 
is evident for firm 2, although the higher correlations due to price effects boost 
the cost of intrafamily correlation to about 10.5 percent of the risk premium. 
I can also use the technique described above to investigate the counterfactual 
that the level of intrafamily correlation around the threshold of zero persists 
into the higher ranges of the distribution. I do this by looking at the probabili- 
ties that expenditures exceed zero and assuming that these instead reflect, as 
above, the probabilities that expenditures exceed $2,000. Obviously, the risk 
premiums  will be larger. But my primary interest is, not the risk premiums 
themselves, but how much of the risk premium can be attributed to intrafamily 
correlation of expenditures. 
The actual distribution relevant for these calculations and firm  1 is 
I  Ye < $0  Ye 2 $0 
Y\  < $0 
Y, = $0 
0.2194  0.1008 
(0.0287)  (0.0151) 
0.1264  0.5461 
(0.0309)  (0.0367) 
The distribution constructed from the marginal distribution is 
Y, < $0  Ye 2 $0 
0.1132  0.2143 
(0.0225)  (0.0420) 
Y, = $0  0.2325  0.4400 
(0.0234)  (0.0425) 
The corresponding distributions for firm  2 are 
I  Ye < $0  Ye 2 $0 
Y, < $0 
Y, e  $0 
and 
0.2394  0.1650 
(0.0502)  (0.0568) 
0.1927  0.4030 
(0.05  16)  (0.0583) 
Ye < $0  Ye = $0 
0.1747  0.2297 
(0.0469)  (0.0615) 
0.2573  0.3383 
(0.0470)  (0.06  16) 294  Matthew J. Eichner 
Table 6.10  Estimated Cost of Correlations: Counterfactual Distribution 
Income 
Risk  Risk Premium if p  Percentage 
Premium ($)  Equals Zero ($)  Change 
Firm  I 
$30,000  U(M)  = In M 
U(M)  = M"'5 
U(M)  = ,4405 
U(M)  = M'j75 
$50,000  U(M)  = InM 
U(M)  =  MOT 
$70,000  U(M)  = In M 
U(M)  = Ma25 
U(M)  = M" 75 
U(M)  = Ma= 
U(M)  = M"5 
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U(M)  = Ma5 
U(M)  = M"75 
$50,000  U(M)  = In M 
U(M)  = MU  l5 
LyM) = MU5 
U(M)  = M"'5 
$70,000  U(M)  = In M 
U(M)  = M"" 
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With these distributions in hand, I can repeat the calculation of risk premi- 
ums, which is shown in table 6.10. Moving to a counterfactually more corre- 
lated distribution increases the fraction of the risk premium attributable to in- 
trafamily correlation. For firm 1,  the fraction rises to 21 percent, while for firm 
2, with the presence of  price effects, the fraction reaches 32 percent. Note, 
however, that the  magnitudes of the risk  premiums remain,  as before, very 
small. 
6.7  Summary and Conclusion 
The empirical work in this paper suggests that, while correlation of expendi- 
tures among married partners is large at the low end of the expenditure distri- 
bution, the relation diminishes appreciably in the upper ranges. For example, 
I estimate correlations for positive expenditures of 0.41 for firm  1 and 0.69 for 
firm 2. But the correlations in expenditures  above $4,000 are only 0.13 and 295  The Impact of  Intrafamily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
0.14, respectively. Thus, while these correlations may be important in the lower 
ranges of the expenditure distribution, they decrease appreciably in the ranges 
relevant for a discussion of catastrophic health insurance  schemes. Further- 
more, the utility cost of this correlation is quite small as a percentage of the 
risk premium required to induce an individual to face the uncertainty in a pro- 
totypical major risk policy. For the firm  1 plan, which like a prototypical cata- 
strophic plan is structured so that spending by one family member does not 
reduce the price for care paid by other family members, only about 6 percent 
of the risk premium is due to intrafamily correlation. Thus the existence of in- 
trafamily correlation is unlikely to appreciably complicate the analysis or im- 
plementation of catastrophic insurance coverage. 
More generally, the calculations in this paper reveal that the entire risk pre- 
mium, and not just the portion related to intrafamily correlation, is quite small 
under a set of standard assumptions about the form of the utility function. The 
risk premiums for the prototypical catastrophic plan, even abstracting from any 
behavior response to the greater cost sharing, are no more than $20 in the most 
extreme case. Such small numbers, of course, raise more general questions 
about why individuals are consistently observed paying a great deal in premi- 
ums to avoid relatively small amounts of additional risk. Additional  insight 
into this behavior will be a major goal of  future work involving the broader 
issue of plan choice. 
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Matt Eichner constructs a unique data set on family medical expenditures to 
study the implications of such correlation. He asks four questions: First, how 
correlated are medical expenditures within couples? Second, is that correlation 
different for large and small expenditures? Third, how is the degree of correla- 
tion related to deductibles and coinsurance? Fourth, what are the utility conse- 
quences of  such correlation for the value of  medical insurance? 
The Data 
The author has assembled an impressive set of claims data for two Fortune 
500 firms, matching spouses’ expenditures and aggregating the claims data by 
health episodes. As the author’s recent work demonstrates, such data can prove 
extremely useful for studying a range of questions related to families’ claims 
behavior and insurance purchasing behavior. 
An interesting component of the data, which the author exploits in this paper 
as well as in other work, is the difference between the two firms’ insurance 
plans. One firm requires  various types of coinsurance (copayments, deduct- 
ibles); the other does not. As long as the incentive structure is the only differ- 
ence between the two firms that would be relevant for the intrafamily correla- 
tion in insurance behavior (one firm is not a major manufacturer of “bungee” 
jumping equipment, for instance), such variation can shed light on how couples 
behave when price incentives differ. 
The Structure of the Problem 
Insurance companies are worried not about the total variance in health ex- 
penditures but primarily about the variance that is not related to easily observ- 
able characteristics.  If  everyone in the sample had the same expected health 
expenditures, Eichner’s problem would be the fairly straightforward exercise 
of describing the joint distribution of actual expenditures by couples. However, 
his work is complicated by the fact that easily observed demographic charac- 
teristics, such as age and gender, are clearly related to expenditures. Therefore, 
we are less interested in the distribution of total expenditures by each person 
(y,  and y,)  than in the distributions  of  the orthogonal  components of  health 
expenditures (e, and e,) below: 
Y, = X,P + e,9 
Faced  with  the  task of  having  to estimate p in order to  study  e, and el, 
Eichner chooses not to use a highly restrictive parametric form, such as the 
joint normal distribution with a single correlation parameter p,  to describe the 
data. Rather, he  specifies a series of  thresholds  ($500, $1,000, $2,000, and 
$4,000) and uses a bivariate probit estimator to model the likelihood that the 
expenditures of either member of the couple are above or below each thresh- 
old. Since  joint normality of e,  and el would imply the same p and p regardless 297  The Impact of  Intrafamily Correlations on Catastrophic Insurance 
of the threshold used, Eichner’s framework allows him to study correlation at 
various points in the joint distribution of expenditures, while providing a natu- 
ral test for joint normality. 
These results of the first part of the paper are summarized below: 
1.  For each type of expenditure, the estimated correlations were lower at 
higher expenditure thresholds,  although the estimated correlations generally 
remained positive. 
2. The intracouple correlations  in expenditures  were generally lower  for 
surgical episodes than for other types of medical episodes. 
3. The  intracouple  correlations  at  levels  of  expenditure  below  $4,000 
tended to be greater in firm 2, which had fewer coinsurance features. 
4.  There was little evidence to suggest that intracouple correlations varied 
with the couple’s age. 
The author draws the plausible conclusion that  shared tastes  for medical 
care are more likely to produce covariance in small expenditures than in larger 
expenditures such as major surgeries. This conclusion is bolstered by the find- 
ing that the magnitude of intracouple correlation was higher at the firm with 
less coinsurance, primarily at lower spending thresholds. 
Although the results are both plausible and interesting, I have two concerns 
with the first section of the paper. First, I could imagine that different forms of 
measurement error in health care expenditures would affect different parts of 
the joint distribution differently. For example, suppose that a couple’s expendi- 
tures were truncated-such  as when the employee left the firm, died, or started 
using his or her spouse’s insurance. Any error that resulted in the simultaneous 
loss of both spouses’ expenditure data would lead to greater correlation in ex- 
penditure at lower levels. Moreover, any errors in the assignment of  claims 
to different types of episodes-surgical,  medical, or injury/poisoning-could 
produce more “random” variation in various parts of the joint distribution, de- 
pending on the nature of the error. 
Whether such errors in categorization are important would depend on the 
question being asked. For instance, an insurance company setting annual de- 
ductibles would not necessarily  care about the impact of  using  an arbitrary 
accounting unit  such as a  year, which would  produce  both  left-  and right- 
censored expenditure episodes. For setting annual deductibles, it is the distri- 
bution of truncated or uncompleted spells that matters. However, for drawing 
conclusions about the influence of “tastes” on joint expenditures, sorting out 
the implications of various types of measurement error could be important. 
Second, finding different correlation coefficients at different cut points may 
be a cause for concern-not  just for the assumption that the distribution is 
joint normal throughout the range of  expenditures, but even for whether the 
bivariate probit is the right specification. For instance, such findings may sug- 
gest that the joint distribution of ei and ej  is also nonsymmetric. In future work, 
the author might experiment with other specifications of the distribution of ei 
and ej. 298  Matthew J. Eichner 
Utility Implications of Intracouple Correlation 
In section 6.6 of the paper, the author explores the implications  of intra- 
couple correlation for the value of an insurance policy with a $2,000 per person 
deductible. He calculates the certainty equivalent "cost"  of that correlation in 
the following way. First, he uses his estimates to calculate the probability that 
a couple with a given set of characteristics  would find themselves in each of 
four quadrants,  with the employee spending above or below $2,000 and the 
spouse spending above or below $2,000.  (Call these probabilities POo, Po1,  PI0, 
and P".) He then calculates the mean expenditures in each of  the four quad- 
rants. (Call these em, eo',  elo, and e".)  Using a log utility function with income 
M, the author calculates  the risk premium under correlated  expenditures by 
solving for c,: 
U(M - c,)  = P"U(M - e")  + PO'U(M - eol) + PIOU(M - elo) 
+ P"U(M - e"). 
Having correlated medical expenditures means that the likelihood of falling 
into each of  the quadrants is not equal to the product of the individual likeli- 
hoods that the employee or his spouse has expenditures above or below the 
relevant threshold. For example, the likelihood of both persons spending above 
$2,000 (PI)  is greater than the product of the probability that each individually 
has expenditures above $2,000. Such correlation  can be costly for a couple, 
and Eichner seeks to estimate this cost. To  do so, he then calculates a second 
certainty equivalent, c,,  to approximate the certainty equivalent with indepen- 
dent expenditures by solving the following equation: 
U(M - c,)  = (P  + P"') * (P"  + P)U(M - e")  + 
(P"  + PI)  * (PO'  + P")U(M - eol) + 
(P  + PI0) * (PI" + P")U(M - elo) + 
(P'" + PI1)  * (PI0 + PL')U(M  - e"). 
The difference in risk premiums, c,  -  c,,  provides an estimate of  the "cost" 
to families of having  correlated health  expenditures. At a family income of 
$30,000,  Eichner estimates that intrafamily correlation raises the risk premium 
by roughly  10 percent over what two individuals  with uncorrelated expendi- 
tures would have been willing to pay. 
However, the above calculation probably  misstates the cost of intracouple 
correlation for at least two reasons: First, the method calculates only the utility 
cost of movements of probability mass between the four quadrants; it does not 
take into account the utility cost of movements of probability mass within each 
of the four quadrants. Particularly because expenditures are correlated below 






Fig. 6C.1  Families can trade individual risk (A) for less combined risk (B) 
creased likelihood that the couple will face payments of $1,999 for each. Al- 
though Eichner’s choice of the bivariate probit allows him to ignore the shape 
of the density surface within each of the quadrants,  it also means that he is 
forced  to focus only on between-quadrant  shifts in  density  rather  than  the 
within-quadrant shifts. 
Second, because  the bonds  of  matrimony  allow couples to enforce cost- 
sharing agreements better than two strangers with less correlated expenditures 
could do, they can avoid some of the costs of having correlated expenditures 
by purchasing a policy with a joint deductible. As illustrated in figure 6C.1, by 
buying a policy with a family deductible rather than an individual deductible, 
a family can trade off less insurance against individual risk (A) by buying more 
insurance against pooled risk (B).  Here, the couple’s deductible would be less 
than two times the individual deductible. Yet the insurance company’s expected 
cost would be unchanged as long as the expected cost in the area B is just equal 
to the expected cost in the areas labeled A. Even though any two strangers on 
the street might also be able to benefit from pooling their resources and sharing 
the cost of health care, they lack the means that a family would have for enforc- 
ing it. 
Conclusion 
This paper is an early contribution to what promises to be an important line 
of research on families’ claims behavior and insurance purchasing decisions. 
Expenditures among couples and for a given person over time are likely to be 300  Matthew J. Eichner 
correlated. As Eichner points out, this may well have strong welfare implica- 
tions for different types of insurance. Moreover, sorting out the source of  the 
correlation is crucial. To  the extent that expenditures are correlated because of 
price effects-for  instance, having used up my family’s deductible, I lower the 
cost for my  wife’s next  procedure-rather  than  taste effects,  such variation 
may also be a valuable source of exogeneity for studying the price elasticity of 
demand for medical care. 